I am a doctoral candidate in microeconomic theory at Rice University. My current research focuses on the dynamic aspects of collective decision-making. I am interested in environments with asymmetric information and applications spanning political economics and corporate governance. I am currently on the 2021/22 job market and will be available for interviews at the 2021 EEA job market and ASSA 2022 annual meeting. I will present my job market paper at the EWMES 2021.

Curriculum Vitae

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  1. Dynamic Legislative Bargaining (with Hülya Eraslan and Jan Zápal)
    to appear in Bargaining: Current Research and Future Directions, 2021

    This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome of bargaining in the previous period. After describing a general framework, we discuss bargaining over distributive policies, bargaining over spatial policies, existence issues, efficiency issues and open questions.
  2. Uniqueness of Equilibrium Payoffs in the Stochastic Model of Bargaining
    published in Economics Letters, 2020

    I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications.
  3. Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining (with Hülya Eraslan)
    published in Annual Review of Economics, 2019

    This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

Working papers

  1. Agreement Rules and Communication in Policy Bargaining
    Job Market Paper

    An agenda-setter makes a policy proposal to two voters and can revise the initial proposal if it is rejected. Voters have distinct but correlated preferences, which the agenda-setter is uncertain about. I compare unanimity rule and majority rule from the agenda-setter's perspective. Under unanimity rule, the initial proposal can be rejected with different levels of support from voters, while under majority rule, the initial proposal is rejected only when it receives no support from voters. Therefore, bargaining under unanimity rule allows more flexibility in using anticipated revisions to provide incentives for voters in the first period compared to majority rule. I derive the conditions under which the agenda-setter prefers unanimity rule to majority rule despite needing to seek approval from both voters under the former voting rule. However, the agenda-setter always prefers majority rule to unanimity rule when voters are able to communicate before casting their votes. Communication allows voters to use joint deviations and eliminates equilibria under unanimity rule in which the agenda-setter extracts all surplus from voters. Nonetheless, the agenda-setter can exploit the conflict of interests between the voters and benefit from the ability to make a revised proposal.
  2. Equality in Legislative Bargaining

    I study a distributive model of legislative bargaining in which the surpluses generated by coalitions equal the sums of productivities of coalition members. The heterogeneous ability of players to generate surplus leads to asymmetric bargaining prospects in otherwise symmetric environments. More productive players are recruited more often by other players despite having higher expected payoffs; however, the players who are recruited in every coalition have equal expected payoffs despite having different productivity. I show that an increase in the required quota raises equality as measured by the Gini coefficient.

Work in progress

  1. Search Perspective on Policy Bargaining with Asymmetric Information

  2. Single-Subject Rule in Policy Bargaining with Asymmetric Information

  3. Information Aggregation with Monopoly Agenda Control

  4. Passive Compliance in Reputational Bargaining (with Hülya Eraslan and Mingzi Niu)


Hülya Eraslan (Advisor)
Department of Economics
Rice University
(713) 348-3453

Mallesh M. Pai
Department of Economics
Rice University
(713) 348-2289

Nina Bobkova
Department of Economics
Rice University