I am a Postdoctoral Research Associate at Princeton University. My current research focuses on the dynamic aspects of collective decision-making under asymmetric information and the effects of decision-making institutions on political accountability and development. I hold a PhD in Economics from Rice University and an MA in Economics from New Economic School.

Curriculum Vitae

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Journal articles

  1. Uniqueness of Equilibrium Payoffs in the Stochastic Model of Bargaining
    Economics Letters, 2020

    I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications.

Working papers

  1. Equality in Legislative Bargaining
    Revise and resubmit at Journal of Economic Theory

    I study a distributive model of legislative bargaining in which the surpluses generated by coalitions equal the sums of productivities of coalition members. The heterogeneous ability of players to generate surplus leads to asymmetric bargaining prospects in otherwise symmetric environments. More productive players are recruited more often by other players despite having higher expected payoffs; however, the players who are recruited in every coalition have equal expected payoffs despite having different productivity. I show that an increase in the required quota raises equality as measured by the Gini coefficient.
  2. The Coase Conjecture and Agreement Rules in Policy Bargaining
    Updated version coming soon

    An agenda-setter proposes a spatial policy to voters and can revise the initial proposal if it gets rejected. Voters can communicate with each other and have distinct but correlated preferences, which the agenda-setter is uncertain about. I investigate whether the ability to make a revised proposal is valuable to the agenda-setter. When a single acceptance is required to pass a policy, the equilibrium outcome is unique and has a screening structure. Because the preferences of voters are single-peaked, the Coase conjecture is violated and the ability to make a revised proposal is valuable. When two or more acceptances are required to pass a policy, there is an interval of the agenda-setter's equilibrium expected payoffs. The endpoints have a screening structure, leading to the same conclusions as in the case of a single acceptance. Interestingly, an increase in the required quota $q$ may allow the agenda-setter to extract more surplus from voters. An application to spending referenda suggests that the expected budget may increase in response to allowing the bureaucrat to make a revised proposal and/or an increase in the number of voters whose acceptance is required.

Other publications

  1. Dynamic Legislative Bargaining (with Hülya Eraslan and Jan Zápal)
    Bargaining: Current Research and Future Directions, Palgrave Macmillan, 2022

    This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome of bargaining in the previous period. After describing a general framework, we discuss bargaining over distributive policies, bargaining over spatial policies, existence issues, efficiency issues and open questions.
  2. Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining (with Hülya Eraslan)
    Annual Review of Economics, 2019

    This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

Work in progress

  1. Search Perspective on Policy Bargaining with Asymmetric Information

  2. Single-Subject Rule in Policy Bargaining with Asymmetric Information

  3. Information Aggregation with Monopoly Agenda Control

  4. Passive Compliance in Reputational Bargaining (with Hülya Eraslan and Mingzi Niu)


Hülya Eraslan (Advisor)
Department of Economics
Rice University
(713) 348-3453

Mallesh M. Pai
Department of Economics
Rice University
(713) 348-2289

Nina Bobkova
Department of Economics
Rice University