"Uniqueness of Equilibrium Payoffs in the Stochastic Model of Bargaining" Economics Letters, 2020
I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications.
"Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining" (with Hülya Eraslan) Annual Review of Economics, 2019
This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.
I generalize the distributive model of legislative bargaining with a random selection of proposers by allowing the surplus generated by coalitions to depend on the membership and the proposer. I also allow coalitions to increase their surplus by recruiting additional members, which creates incentives to form oversized coalitions. This model applies to the formation of teams lead by leaders, e.g., coalitional governments formed around prime ministers in parliamentary democracies. I prove that a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium exists and the set of equilibrium expected payoff vectors is upper hemicontinuous in player characteristics. When the surplus does not depend on the proposer's identity, the vector of expected payoffs is unique and continuous. I show that heterogeneity in the ability of players to generate surplus in otherwise symmetric environments leads to asymmetric bargaining prospects. More productive players have higher expected payoffs despite being recruited more often by others. Bargaining outcomes are equal and efficient when productivity is sufficiently homogeneous, while the effects of increasing heterogeneity depend on how skewed the distribution of productivity is. When players become arbitrarily patient, bargaining outcomes are equitable and efficient, but not necessarily equal. Finally, an increase in required quota promotes equality but leads to less equitable outcomes.
"Dynamic Legislative Bargaining" (with Hülya Eraslan and Jan Zápal) 2020
This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome of bargaining in the previous period. After describing a general framework, we discus bargaining over distributive policies, bargaining over spatial policies, existence issues, efficiency issues and open questions.
"Information Aggregation with Monopoly Agenda Control" draft coming soon
"Continuity and Completeness Without Independence" 2015
In a framework similar to Dubra (2011), I prove that any two of the following properties imply the third: Double Mixture Continuity, Archimedean, and Completeness. A stronger version of the continuity axiom, employed by several authors, allows me to do so without assuming Independence.