I provide a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs in a model of stochastic bargaining with unanimity rule and risk-averse players. My Condition (S) implies Condition (C) of Merlo and Wilson (1995) and is easy to verify in applications.

"Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining" (with Hülya Eraslan) Annual Review of Economics, 2019

This review of the theoretical literature on legislative and multilateral bargaining begins with presentation of the seminal Baron-Ferejohn model. The review then encompasses the extensions to bargaining among asymmetric players in terms of bargaining power, voting weights, and time and risk preferences; spatial bargaining; bargaining over a stochastic surplus; bargaining over public goods; legislative bargaining with alternative bargaining protocols in which players make demands, compete for recognition, or make counterproposals; and legislative bargaining with cheap talk communication.

Research papers

"Multilateral Bargaining with Asymmetric Information" draft coming soon

Three players with single-peaked preferences bargain over a one-dimensional policy. The ideal points of players have fixed order but vary with a common state. The Right player, the agenda-setter, is uninformed and makes proposals until one of them is approved. The Left and Moderate players, the voters, receive (im)perfect signals of the state and vote on each proposal. The ideal points of voters move to the Right as the state increases. Under the majority rule, the unique equilibrium path has a screening structure but may force the Left voter's expected payoff below the status-quo level. The unanimity rule gives veto power to voters and either leads to more attractive offers being made or to an indefinite gridlock. In the former case, the expected payoffs of voters are higher under the unanimity rule, and in the latter case, the expected payoffs of all players are higher under the majority rule. Gridlock emerges when the lack of commitment eliminates the agenda-setting power and the only proposal acceptable for voters in every state is not acceptable for the agenda-setter ex-ante.

I study a distributive model of legislative bargaining in which the surplus generated by coalitions depends on the membership and the proposer. The vector of expected payoffs is unique and continuous in the characteristics of players when the surplus does not depend on the proposer's identity. The heterogeneous ability of players to generate surplus leads to asymmetric bargaining prospects in otherwise symmetric environments. More productive players have higher expected payoffs despite being recruited more often by other players, and the players who participate in every coalition have equal expected payoffs despite having different productivity. The bargaining outcomes are equal and efficient when the productivity is sufficiently homogeneous, while the effect of increased heterogeneity depends on the distribution of productivity. When the players become arbitrarily patient, the bargaining outcomes are equitable and efficient but not necessarily equal. An increase in the required quota promotes equality but leads to less equitable outcomes.

"Dynamic Legislative Bargaining" (with Hülya Eraslan and Jan Zápal) 2020

This article surveys the theoretical literature on legislative bargaining with endogenous status-quo. These are the legislative bargaining situations in which in each period a new policy is decided and the policy implemented in the event of no agreement is endogenously determined by the outcome of bargaining in the previous period. After describing a general framework, we discus bargaining over distributive policies, bargaining over spatial policies, existence issues, efficiency issues and open questions.

Research in progress

"Information Aggregation with Monopoly Agenda Control"

I study the trade-off between the signaling and pivotal incentives in the model of information aggregation in repeated referendums with persistent and uninformed agenda-setter.

"Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining with Transferable Utility"

I derive the restrictions on characteristic function that guarantee the uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in a model of coalitional bargaining with random recognition and transferable utility.